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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 









Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc. 
    
Present: The Honorable 
 
ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. 
 
Carla Badirian  N/A  
Deputy Clerk  Court Reporter 
  
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: 
 
None Appearing None Appearing 
 
Proceedings:  [In Chambers] Order (1) GRANTING Defendants Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Direct Copyright 
Infringement (Dkt. No. 357) and (2) DENYING AS MOOT 
Plaintiff’s Mirror-Image Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Direct Copyright Infringement (Dkt. 
No. 453)  
Pending before this Court are the parties’ competing motions for partial summary 
judgment regarding Defendant Giganews, Inc.’s (“Giganews”) and Defendant Livewire 
Services, Inc.’ (“Livewire”) liability for direct copyright infringement.  As stated more 
fully below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion. (Dkt. No. 357.)  Even assuming 
certain computer functions could be construed as a violation of Plaintiff Perfect 10, Inc.’s 
(“Perfect 10”) exclusive rights in various images under other circumstances, the 
undisputed evidence demonstrates that Defendants’ automated, content-neutral systems 
are not the direct cause of any infringement at issue in this action and cannot be held 
liable for direct copyright infringement.  Because the Court grants partial summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on the issue of direct infringement, the Court DENIES 
Perfect 10’s competing motion for partial summary judgment on the same issue (Dkt. No. 
453) as MOOT. 
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A. The Structure and Function of the Usenet 
The Usenet is a set of internet transfer protocols that facilitate the transfer of 
information between computer servers and individual client computers.  (Dkt. No. 
438-10, p. 30:4-6.)  As the Court already noted in its order regarding the expert testimony 
of Dr. Tygar, the primary transfer protocol governing every interaction on the Usenet is the 
Network News Transfer Protocol (“NNTP”).  (Dkt. No. 580, p. 8)  Like other parts of the 
internet, including the world-wide web (the “Web”),2 “there is no specific network that is 
the Usenet. Usenet traffic flows over a wide range of networks, including the Internet and 
dial-up phone links.”  Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc. 
(“Netcom”), 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1995);3 see also Dkt. No. 438-5, p. 
67:11-18.  In its broadest sense, the Usenet is “an international collection of organizations 
and individuals (known as ‘peers’) whose computers connect to one another and exchange 
messages posted by USENET users.”  Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1074 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
However, “[t]o obtain access to the USENET, a user must gain access through a 
commercial USENET provider … or an internet service provider.”  Arista Records LLC v. 
Usenet.com, Inc. (“Arista Records”), 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
Defendant Giganews is one such Usenet provider.  (Dkt. No. 357-1, ¶1.)  Giganews owns 
and operates numerous Usenet servers, providing its subscribers access to the content 
stored on Giganews’ servers and, using NNTP, to the content stored on the servers of other 
Usenet providers.  (Dkt. No. 438-5, p. 67:11-18.)  Defendant Livewire does not own or 
operate any of its own Usenet servers.  (Dkt. No. 357-1, ¶¶17-18.)4  Rather, Livewire 
                     
1 The Court has read and considered Defendants’ voluminous evidentiary objections filed along with their reply. In considering 
these motions, the Court does not rely on any inadmissible expert testimony that it already excluded in connection with 
Defendants three Daubert motions. (See Dkt. Nos. 580, 581, & 582.)  To the extent that the Court addresses any disputed 
evidence in this order, Defendants’ objection to that evidence is overruled. 
 
2 The Usenet is, in essence, a subsection of the larger internet of all networked computers.  What most people commonly refer 
to as the “internet” (i.e., the version of the internet most people access through a web browser) is actually a different subset of 
the internet called the world-wide web (the “Web”), which is governed by a different set of transfer protocols – namely 
Hypertext Transfer Procotol (“HTTP”).  See, e.g., American Library Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F.Supp.2d 401, 417 
(E.D.Pa. 2002) (“The World Wide Web is a part of the Internet that consists of a network of computers, called ‘Web servers,’ 
that host ‘pages’ of content accessible via the Hypertext Transfer Protocol or ‘HTTP.’ Anyone with a computer connected to 
the Internet can search for and retrieve information stored on Web servers located around the world. Computer users typically 
access the Web by running a program called a ‘browser’ on their computers.”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. in United 
States v. American Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
 
3 Judge Matz previously took judicial notice of this fact in this action.  (Dkt. No. 97, p. 2, also available at 2013 WL 2109963.) 
 
4 Perfect 10 purports to dispute this fact by noting a single web page on one of Livewire’s affiliated websites which uses the 
phrase “our servers” in passing.  Nothing in that passing phrase, however, suggests that Livewire actually owns or operates any 
Usenet servers itself.  Despite a lengthy opportunity to discover any actual evidence that Livewire owns or operates any 
Usenet servers, Perfect 10 uncovered none, and a single, arguably ambiguous statement on one of Livewire’s affiliated websites 
is insufficient to create a disputed issue of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). 
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provides its customers with access to the Usenet by offering access to content stored on 
Giganews’ Usenet servers.  (Dkt. No. 357-1, ¶19.)5 
As Judge Matz already judicially noticed, “the content on USENET” to which 
Giganews (and Livewire via Giganews’ servers) offer access “is primarily user-driven – 
that is, the content that is stored on a USENET provider’s server is generally uploaded by 
USENET users.”  (Dkt. No. 97, p. 2.)  Users provide this content by posting text-based 
“articles” to online bulletin boards, known as “newsgroups.”  (Id.)  Although there are 
billions of articles posted to the Usenet, each article receives a unique “Message-ID,” a 
string of 20 or more alphanumeric characters.  (Dkt. No. 438-1, p. 50:2-24.)  The only 
way to uniquely identify a Usenet message is by its Message-ID.  (Dkt. No. 369, Exh. 1, 
¶8; Dkt. No. 465-5, p. 71:7-11.)  While a Usenet message contains a number of fields with 
information about the individual message, many other messages can have false or 
duplicative information in other fields.  (Dkt. No. 369, Exh. 1, ¶8.)  For example, 
although a Usenet message contains a “Sender” field in which the user’s email address 
should appear, the “Sender” email address is not verified, and many Usenet users provide 
fake email addresses.  (Dkt. No. 365-9, ¶¶37-38.)6  For that reason, multiple Usenet users 
could post under the same “Sender” name.  (Dkt. No. 465-5, p. 71:1-3; Dkt. No. 465-1, p. 
226:20-24.)7  And because users create their own “Subject” lines (as with any email), it is 
also possible that two different users could post two different articles, but with the same 
“Sender” and “Subject” information.  The only field truly unique to any Usenet article is 
the Message-ID. 
Articles posted to the Usenet are text files.  (Dkt. No. 438-10, p. 42:15.)  However, 
using text, it is possible to encode another type of file (image, song, movie, etc.) into the 
body of an article as a binary file.  (Id., at p. 42:16-20.)  “These binary files are encoded 
in text form for storage and processing, and require a software program to convert the text 
into a content file such as an image or music file.”  Arista Records, 633 F.Supp.2d at 130.  
Additionally, before a user can access or download any Usenet articles to begin with (let 
alone view them), including articles containing encoded binary files, a user must use a 
Usenet browser application.  (Dkt. No. 439-1, Exh. 3, p. 3.)  Giganews offers its own 
Usenet browser, called “Mimo,” which is apparently also capable of decoding binary files 
to display them as images.  (Id; see also Dkt. No. 439-5, Exh. 10.)  Giganews also offers 
                                                                       
 
5 Although Livewire does maintain Web servers (Dkt. No. 357-1, ¶20), the Court has already noted that the world-wide web is 
a different segment of the internet, using a different set of transfer protocols than the Usenet (HTTP as opposed NNTP).  (See 
Footnote 1, supra.)  It is impossible for a Livewire customer to either post or access Usenet messages using one of Livewire’s 
Web servers.  (Dkt. No. 357-1, ¶¶21-23; Dkt. No. 369, ¶16.) 
 
6 According to Defendants’ expert John Levine, this trend began in the early 1990s when email spammers began to use 
automated programs to harvest email addresses from Usenet bulletin boards.  (Dkt. No. 465-9, ¶¶37-38.) 
 
7 That is, two completely different people wishing to keep their email address anonymous could both post under the “Sender” 
name anonymous@anonymous.com. 
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its customers the option of purchasing access to a Virtual Private Network (“VPN”), which 
encrypts and secures data for all forms of internet traffic, including but not limited to 
Usenet, Web, and email traffic.  (Dkt. No. 439-1, Exh. 3, p. 7.) 
“[W]hen an individual user with access to a USENET server posts a message to a 
newsgroup, the message is automatically forwarded to all adjacent USENET servers that 
furnish access to the newsgroup, and it is then propagated to the servers adjacent to those 
servers, etc. The messages are temporarily stored on each receiving server, where they are 
available for review and response by individual users.”  Am. Civil Liberties Union v. 
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  This process by 
which messages posted to one Usenet server are propagated to other Usenet servers is 
fundamental to the NNTP architecture and is commonly known as the “peering” process.  
See Netcom, supra, 907 F.Supp. at 1366 n.4; Arista Records, supra, 633 F.Supp.2d at 130.  
The peering process occurs once two Usenet access providers enter into a “peering 
agreement” by which “they make an affirmative agreement … for two servers to accept 
materials from each other.”  (Dkt. No. 438-10, p. 84:7-9.)  In essence the servers 
cross-check the contents offered on both servers and synchronize their information so that 
the content of one mirrors the content on the other, with certain exceptions discussed 
below.  Given the amount of material Usenet providers exchange during the peering 
process, it is impossible for a Usenet provider to know the content of the individual articles 
exchanged during peering.  (Dkt. No. 438-10, p. 85:5-9.) 
B. Defendants Control Over the Content Available on the Usenet 
Once Giganews has established a peering agreement with another Usenet provider, 
it exercises a certain amount of control over the articles it copies from other servers.  
Giganews servers, for example, compares the unique Message-IDs of messages on peer 
servers to ensure that Giganews does not copy duplicate articles to its servers.  (Dkt. No. 
438-2, p. 149:20-150:4.)  Likewise, if a peer server contains an article with a Message-ID 
that Giganews has already deleted from its servers (for example, in response to a takedown 
notice), Giganews’ servers will not copy that article.  (Id.)  Giganews is also a member of 
the Internet Watch Foundation, which is a voluntary association that identifies individual 
articles (by Message-ID) or sometimes entire newsgroups that contain child pornography.  
(Id. at p. 147-49.)  That process is automated, and the articles or newsgroups are 
automatically deleted or (blocked from peering) from Giganews’ servers based on 
information from the Internet Watch Foundation.  (Id. at p. 149:2-14.) 
Other than setting those basic parameters, Giganews does not select any of the 
content available on its servers.  (Dkt. No. 357-1, ¶4.)  Giganews itself did not post any of 
the articles at issue in this action (containing binary files which, when decoded, contain 
images to which Perfect 10 owns the copyright) to any Usenet server, and all such articles 
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were posted by Usenet users.  (Id., at ¶¶5, 9, 10.)8  Nor does Giganews tell any third 
parties what to upload to the Usenet, including Giganews’ Usenet servers.  (Id., at ¶¶6-7.) 
As a company that merely contracts with Giganews for access to Giganews’ servers, 
Livewire has no control over the content uploaded to, downloaded from, transmitted or 
stored on Giganews’ servers.  (Dkt. No. 375-1, ¶12.)  Nor has Livewire uploaded or 
directed anyone else to upload any materials to which Perfect 10 owns the copyright to the 
Usenet (either to Giganews’ servers or other servers on the Usenet).  (Id. at ¶¶13, 14.) 
C. Giganews’ Response to Various Takedown Requests 
  On its website, Giganews provides an information page for copyright holders, 
informing copyright holders what information Giganews requires to process a takedown 
notice submitted under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA,” 17 U.S.C. 
§512(c)(3).).  (Dkt. No. 439-1, Exh. 3, pp. 11-12.)  On that page, Giganews informs 
copyright holders that, in order to takedown an offending article, Giganews requires the 
“Message-IDs for all articles the DMCA Notice is requesting Giganews take down.”  
(Id., at Exh. 3, p. 11.)  Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(2), Giganews has also designated 
an agent to “receive notifications of claimed infringement” by registering that agent’s 
information with the Copyright Office, and posting the information on Giganews’ 
website.  (Dkt. No. 369, Exh. 1, ¶7; Dkt. No. 439-1, Exh. 3, p. 11.)  Giganews also 
provides copyright holders with a template for generating a DMCA Notice.  (Dkt. No. 
439-1, Exh. 3, p. 11.) 
As the Court has discussed in many prior rulings, Perfect 10 owns the copyright to 
thousands of adult images of nude or semi-nude female models.  Perfect 10 has not 
delegated any of its exclusive rights under those copyrights to Defendants.  (Dkt. No. 
437, ¶25.)  Perfect 10 has served Giganews with a number of letters purporting to be 
takedown notices under the DMCA.  (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 439-11, Exh. 25.)  (Id.)  
Those DMCA Notices instructed Giganews to “locate all of the infringing messages and 
images in this notice by doing [a] mimo search” for a particular search term.  (Id.)  At 
least some of Perfect 10’s DMCA Notices also attached screenshots of the Mimo 
application, which showed Message-IDs for a handful of individual posts, though only 
for a minority of the posts purportedly subject to the notice.  (Id.)  The sufficiency of 
                     
8 Perfect 10 attempts to put this fact in “dispute” by arguing that Defendants have improperly blocked Perfect 10’s attempts to 
identify the individuals who posted the allegedly offending articles.  (See Dkt. No. 437, p. 4.)  Magistrate Judge Hillman has 
already expressly rejected this argument in response to Perfect 10’s motion for discovery sanctions, holding “Perfect 10 has the 
ability to obtain the information it desires, and Giganews is not obstructing Perfect 10's efforts.”  (Dkt. No. 412, p. 2.)  Perfect 
10 further attempts to dispute this fact by contending that, because some allegedly infringing articles posted by third parties 
were exchanged during the peering process, “Giganews is the entity responsible for uploading those messages to its Usenet 
servers, not users.”  (Dkt. No. 437, p. 4.)  As discussed more fully below, Judge Matz has already considered and rejected this 
argument.  (Dkt. No. 97, pp. 10-11.) 
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those DMCA takedown notices is the subject to two other competing motions for partial 
summary judgment.9 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(a).  “The very mission of the summary judgment 
procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there 
is a genuine issue of fact.”  Mende v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 670 F.2d 129, 132 (9th 
Cir. 1982) (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 56).  An issue is “disputed” for 
the purposes of summary judgment so long as “reasonable minds could differ as to the 
import of the evidence… .”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986).  
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court may not weigh 
evidence to resolve disputed questions (Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil, Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 
1161 (9th Cir. 1992)), and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party.  United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).  
However, the “existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not 
defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is 
that there be no genuine issue of material fact.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.   “The 
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [opposing party’s] position will 
be insufficient… .”  Id., at 252.  To avoid summary judgment “there must be evidence 
on which the jury could reasonably find for the” party opposing summary judgment in 
light of the “substantive evidentiary burden” applicable at trial.  Id., at 252, 254. 
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating 
with admissible evidence that there is no disputed issue of material fact as to a claim for 
relief or affirmative defense.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).  The 
moving party may meet this burden in one of two ways.  In its most traditional form, a 
party may obtain summary judgment by submitting uncontroverted evidence that 
affirmatively disproves an essential element of the opposing party’s claim or defense.  
                     
9 Perfect 10 also points to three individual Giganews users whose accounts Giganews terminated under Giganews’ “two-strike” 
policy of terminating user accounts after two valid DMCA Notices linked to that individual user’s account, or who have 
otherwise been identified as posting at least two infringing items.  (Dkt. No. 436 pp. 8-10; Dkt. No. 437, ¶¶26-45.)  Perfect 10 
suggests that Giganews’ refusal to take down every post associated with a repeat infringer, as opposed to its practice of taking 
down specific posts identified by their Message-IDs, somehow makes it liable as a direct infringer.  (Dkt. No. 436, p. 19.)  
However, Judge Collins has expressly rejected Perfect 10’s argument that the Copyright Act “requires a service provider to 
disable or delete all messages a repeat infringer has ever posted” as opposed to disabling the users account and removing 
specifically identified messages.  (Dkt. No. 180, p. 9.)  The Court agrees with Judge Collins analysis.  The Copyright act 
requires “termination … of subscribers and account holders” associated with a repeat infringer, not deletion of every message 
ever posted by a repeat infringer.  As Judge Collins observed, such a rule “would require a service provider to take down all of 
a user’s messages, not just the infringing ones.”  (Dkt. No. 180, p. 9.)  Such a result would fly in the face of the DMCA, which 
“place[s] the burden of policing copyright infringement—identifying the potentially infringing material and adequately 
documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1113 
(9th Cir. 2007) (“declin[ing] to shift [that] substantial burden from the copyright owner to the provider”).  The Court does not 
address this argument, or the facts associated with it, further. 
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Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 398 U.S. 144, 158-60 (1970).  This is sometimes referred to 
as the “tried-and-true” form of summary judgment.  Alternatively, the moving party 
may carry its initial burden by demonstrating that the opposing party lacks sufficient 
evidence to prove its claim or affirmative defense at trial.  Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
56(c)(1)(B); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.  This form of summary judgment is sometimes 
known as a “no evidence” motion for summary judgment, and summary judgment on that 
ground will only lie after the opposing party has had an adequate opportunity to conduct 
discovery.  Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56(d); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 326. 
Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, the burden shifts to the 
non-moving party to show a triable issue of material fact.   At that point, “[t]he 
non-moving party must make an affirmative showing on all matters placed in issue by the 
motion as to which it has the burden of proof at trial.”  Fed. Ins. Co. v. Burlington N. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 F.Supp.2d 1183, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2003).  The party opposing 
summary judgment may “not rest on his allegations … to get to a jury” and avoid 
summary judgment.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.  “[I]nstead, the nonmoving party must 
introduce some ‘significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.’”   
Fazio v. City & County of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).  The question is not whether the non-moving party is able 
to muster any evidence that would support it claim for relief but “whether [the evidence] 
is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 
251-52  Nor can a party oppose summary judgment based on theories of liability or 
affirmative defenses not set forth in the pleadings because “the issues in the complaint 
guide the parties during discovery and put the defendant on notice of what evidence is 
necessary to defend against the allegations.”  Ortiz v. Lopez, 688 F.Supp.2d 1072, 1082 
(citing Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1292–1293 (9th Cir.2000). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A copyright protects a number of “exclusive rights” vested solely in the holder of a 
valid copyright.  17 U.S.C. §106.  Relevant here, those rights are the rights to (1) 
reproduce, (2) create derivative works, (3) distribute, and (4) publicly display the 
copyrighted work.  17 U.S.C. §106(1)-(3), (5).  Courts “recognize three doctrines of 
copyright liability” for usurpation of those exclusive rights: “direct copyright 
infringement, contributory copyright infringement, and vicarious copyright infringement.”  
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).  In this action, Perfect 10 
pursues all three theories of liability.  These motions concern Perfect 10’s claim for direct 
copyright infringement. 
To succeed on a claim of direct copyright infringement, Perfect 10 must satisfy two 
elements: “(1) they must show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they 
must demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to 
copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106.”  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 
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1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). The first element, ownership of the copyright, is not disputed in 
this action.  Rather, Perfect 10’s claim for direct infringement hinges on the second 
element for such a claim: whether Defendants themselves violated any of Perfect 10’s 
exclusive rights protected by their copyrights in the subject images.  Ellison v. Robertson, 
357 F.3d at 1076 (“To prove a claim of direct copyright infringement, a plaintiff must 
show...that the defendant himself violated one or more of the plaintiff's exclusive rights 
under the Copyright Act.”) (emphasis added).  “There is no need to prove anything about 
a defendant's mental state to establish copyright infringement; it is a strict liability tort.”  
Educational Testing Service v. Simon, 95 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999). 
A. Direct Liability Under the Copyright Act Requires a Causal Nexus 
Between the Defendant’s Active Conduct and the Infringement 
Just what it means for direct copyright infringement to be a strict liability tort, 
however, has been the subject of some disagreement among the courts (including various 
courts of this district).  In a seminal opinion on the nature of strict liability for direct 
infringement, Judge Whyte of the Northern District of California held that “[a]lthough 
copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of volition or 
causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a 
third party.”  Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1370 (holding Usenet provider not liable for direct 
infringement for infringing content stored on its servers that was uploaded by a Usenet 
subscriber).  In Netcom, the court held the fact that “incidental copies automatically made 
on [a Usenet provider’s] computers using their software as a part of a process initiated by a 
third party” did not give rise to liability for direct infringement.  Id. at 1369.  This result 
centered on two key considerations. 
The first, and most important, factor in the Netcom analysis is the element of 
causation.  Strict liability may obviate the need for a showing of intent or negligence, but 
it does not obviate the independent element of causation, which is a necessary prerequisite 
to Article III standing.  At minimum, “there must be a causal connection between the 
injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly ... trace[able] to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.’”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 
(1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 
(1976).  In the context of direct copyright liability, the relevant question for the purposes 
of causation “is who made this copy.”  Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 
536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008).  “[T]he purpose of any causation-based liability 
doctrine is to identify the actor (or actors) whose ‘conduct has been so significant and 
important a cause that [he or she] should be legally responsible.’  Id. at 132. (quoting W. 
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 42, at 273 (5th ed.1984).  Inherent in 
any claim for direct liability under the Copyright Act, then, is a plaintiff’s need to prove the 
defendant was the direct cause of the injury.  Put another way, to establish causation on a 
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claim for direct liability, “defendants must actively engage in one of the activities 
recognized in the Copyright Act.”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 
F.Supp.2d 1146, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (Baird, J).  Where, as here, the plaintiff fails to 
show that the defendant “himself uploaded or downloaded the files, or directly caused such 
uploading or downloading to occur,” there can be no liability for direct infringement.  
Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F.Supp. 923, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (no liability for 
direct infringement against proprietor of online bulletin board system where proprietor 
operated online bulletin board, knew infringing activity was occurring, and solicited others 
to upload infringing content).  A system that “automatically transmits users' material but 
is itself totally indifferent to the material's content” is no more the direct cause of acts 
committed by its subscribers than is “a traditional telephone company when it transmits the 
contents of its users’ conversations.”  CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 
551 (4th Cir. 2004) (adopting holding in Netcom).  In passing, the Netcom court referred 
to this sort of direct conduct as an “element of volition or causation.”  Netcom, 907 
F.Supp. at 1370. 
The second consideration in Netcom’s rationale is a policy concern that goes to the 
heart of modern communications.  Specifically, the court noted “it does not make sense to 
adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role in the 
infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is necessary for 
the functioning of the Internet.”  Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1372.  “There are thousands of 
owners, contractors, servers, and users involved in the Internet whose role involves the 
storage and transmission of data in the establishment and maintenance of an Internet 
facility.”  CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d at 551.  To hold a service 
provider liable in strict liability for the discrete acts of third party copyright infringers 
because the infringing material was stored on or passed through the service provider’s 
facilities would be, in effect, to hold the entire internet liable for the bad acts of a few.  The 
Copyright Act neither requires nor permits such a result.  In applying the act, courts “must 
strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective – not merely 
symbolic – protection of the statutory monopoly and the rights of others freely to engage in 
substantially unrelated areas of commerce.”  Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (sale and distribution of equipment that make it 
possible for third parties to infringe on copyright does not constitute even indirect 
infringement so long as the equipment is even “capable of substantial noninfringing uses”).  
To conclude that service providers “are copyright infringers simply because they are 
involved in the ownership, operation, or maintenance of a transmission facility that 
automatically records material—copyrighted or not—would miss the thrust of the 
protections afforded by the Copyright Act.”  CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 
F.3d at 551.  Although the Ninth Circuit has not passed on Netcom’s causation analysis, 
both the Second and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeal have adopted it.  Cartoon Network 
LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d at 131 (2d Cir. 2008); Costar Group, Inc. v. 
Case 2:11-cv-07098-AB-SH   Document 619   Filed 11/14/14   Page 9 of 17   Page ID #:34425
CV-90 (12/02) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk CB  
10 
 
Loopnet, Inc. 373 F.3d at 555 (4th Cir. 2004).10 
Some courts of this district have declined to follow Netcom (although no Circuit 
Court of Appeals has done so).  But the courts that have done so appear to have given 
more weight to Netcom’s diction and less to its underlying rationale.  In Arista Records 
LLC v. Myxer, Inc. (Myxer), No. CV 08-03935 GAF (JCx), 2011 WL 11660773 (C.D. Cal. 
April 1, 2011) (Fees, J), for example, the court declined to follow Netcom because 
“copyright infringement is a strict liability offense” and “the so-called volitional conduct 
requirement” is in conflict with strict liability.  Id. at *14; see also Warner Bros. 
Entertainment, Inc. v. WTV Systems, Inc., 824 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1011 n.7 (Walter, J) (same, 
citing Myxer).  Admittedly, the Netcom court’s passing use11 of the term “volition” is 
somewhat confusing, as that term can potentially suggest a level of intent or willfulness 
that has no place in a claim for copyright infringement.  But as the logic of that case, and 
the subsequent cases applying it, make clear, the so-called “volition” element of direct 
infringement is not a judicially-created element of intent or knowledge; it is a basic 
requirement of causation.  As its name suggests, direct liability must be premised on 
conduct that can reasonably be described as the direct cause of the infringement “with a 
nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one could conclude that the 
machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive domain of the copyright owner.”  
Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc. 373 F.3d at 550 (“to establish direct liability under [the 
Copyright Act and the DMCA], something more must be shown than mere ownership of a 
machine used by others to make illegal copies”).12  
B. The Undisputed Evidence Shows Defendants Did Not Directly 
Infringe on Perfect 10’s Copyrights 
1. Giganews 
                     
10Although Netcom was decided prior to the enactment of the DMCA, including the safe harbor provision for service providers 
found in that statute (17 U.S.C. §512(c)), the Fourth Circuit in CoStar rejected the argument that the DMCA supplanted the 
need for Netcom’s analysis.  CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d at 552-55.  As the Fourth Circuit observed in that 
case, the DMCA expressly provides that the availability of its safe harbor provisions “shall not bear adversely upon the 
consideration of a defense by the service provider that the service provider’s conduct is not infringing … or any other defense.  
17 U.S.C. §512(l).  Moreover, even if the DMCA arguably mitigated the policy argument in favor of Netcom’s result, it does 
not affect Netcom’s more fundamental point: direct infringement requires a showing of direct conduct. 
 
11 Although the word “volition” is oft-quoted by cases citing to Netcom, it appears only twice in Judge Whyte’s lengthy 
analysis.  In both instances, the term is found immediately next to a reference to causation. 
 
12 Both Myxer and Warner Bros. Entertainment also construed the Ninth Circuits silence on this question despite the Second 
and Fourth Circuit’s adoption of it as an implicit rejection of Netcom.  See Myxer, 2011 WL 11660773 at *14; Warner Bros. 
Entertainment, Inc. v. WTV Systems, Inc., 824 F.Supp.2d at 1011 n.7.  However, the Court agrees with Judge Matz’ conclusion 
in this case that “silence on the so-called ‘volitional conduct requirement” should not be interpreted as disapproval.  (Dkt. No. 
97, p. 9.)  Rather, the Ninth Circuit has been clear that it declined to reach the issue.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 
508 F.3d 1146, 1160 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to determine “whether an entity that merely passively owns and manages an 
Internet bulletin board or similar system violates a copyright owner's display and distribution rights when the users of the 
bulletin board or similar system post infringing works” and citing CoStar Group). 
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Turning to the undisputed evidence before the Court, Defendants have met their 
burden to establish that Perfect 10 cannot prove causation for direct infringement as a 
matter of law.  Indeed, on identical facts (then presented as allegations, now with 
evidence), Judge Matz and Judge Collins already so held.  (Dkt. Nos. 97, 129.)  In 
dismissing Perfect 10’s initial claim for direct infringement, for example, Judge Matz 
held that, even if true, the fact that Defendants: 
 “copy all of the materials on their servers form content uploaded onto 
USENET”; 
 “‘program their servers’ to distribute and download the infringing content”; 
 “‘control which materials are distributed to and copied from other third party 
servers’”; 
 store infringing content on their servers; 
 make it possible, through their Mimo software, for subscribers to “display 
the USENET content from the Defendants’ servers” or to download it 
directly; and 
 derive their “ability to generate revenue … almost exclusively [from] 
demand for the pirated works contained in the” various binary-oriented 
newsgroups 
is insufficient to establish direct liability.  (Dkt. No. 97, pp. 3, 6-7, 10-13.)13  In so 
holding, Judge Matz declined to follow the cases Perfect 10 relies upon here to assert the 
same facts support a finding of direct infringement as a matter of law.  (Dkt. No. 97, pp. 
11-13).  Judge Matz noted that the courts in Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 
633 F.Supp.2d 124 (S.D.N.Y 2009), Perfect 10, Inc. v. MegaUpload, No. CV 11-0191, 
Doc. 16 at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011), Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 
Civ. 9931 (WHP), 2009 WL 3364036, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2009), and Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F.Supp. 503, 513 (N.D. Ohio 1997) all 
suffered the same error in adopting Netcom’s holding as the courts noted above made in 
rejecting it.  (Dkt. No. 97, p. 12.) 
 Specifically, each of those cases read the inaptly-named “volitional” conduct 
requirement as “focusing on the defendant’s awareness or state of mind” (which is 
immaterial in a strict liability claim for direct infringement) “rather than on who actually 
caused the infringement … .”  (Dkt. No. 97, p. 12 (emphasis in original).; accord Disney 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., 798 F.Supp.2d 1303, 1309 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (declining 
to follow those cases on identical grounds).)  “‘[K]nowledge coupled with inducement’ 
or ‘supervision coupled with a financial interest in the illegal copying’ gives rise to 
secondary liability, not direct-infringement liability.”  Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Hotfile 
Corp., 798 F.Supp.2d at 1309 (quoting CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d at 
                     
13 Judge Matz’ opinion can also be found at Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., Dkt. No. CV 11-07098 AHM (SHx), 2013 WL 
2109963 (C.D. Cal. March 8, 2013). 
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549.  Again, a claim for direct liability requires evidence that the Defendants directly or 
actively caused the infringement.  Perfect 10’s continued insistence that Defendants 
allowed its subscribers to upload, download, and view infringing material is the stuff of 
indirect or secondary liability, not direct liability. 
 Four months after Judge Matz rejected each of the arguments Perfect 10 advances 
in opposition to this motion, Judge Collins reaffirmed that the evidence before the Court 
does not support a claim for direct infringement as a matter of law.  (Dkt. No. 128.)  
Faced with the same allegations discussed above and now set forth in the evidence before 
the Court, Judge Collins again held that such allegations were insufficient as a matter of 
law to support a finding of direct infringement because such facts fail to support a finding 
of direct causation.  (Id., at pp. 3-4.)  However, Judge Collins permitted Perfect 10’s 
claim for direct infringement against Giganews to proceed solely on the newly alleged 
theory that Giganews “plac[ed] copies of copyrighted material from various internet 
locations onto its own servers, and not at the request of customers … .”  (Dkt. No. 128, 
p. 3.)  Judge Collins expressly rejected each of Perfect 10’s other theories of direct 
liability.  (Dkt. No. 128, at pp. 3-4.)  
Although Perfect 10 repeats the arguments Judge Matz and Judge Collins already 
rejected, the record is devoid of any evidence to support the only theory of direct liability 
as to Giganews that survived the pleading stage.  In the operative First Amended 
Complaint, Plaintiff alleged on information and belief that Giganews itself, by way of its 
employees, had uploaded infringing Perfect 10 images to the Usenet generally or 
Giganews’ servers specifically.  (Dkt. No. 105, ¶¶40-43.)  Though Judge Collins noted 
this was “not the strongest set of allegations,” Judge Collins held that it was at least 
sufficiently plausible to pass the pleading stage in light of the fact that another website, 
megaupload.com, had previously been found in criminal proceedings to have uploaded 
massive quantities of copyrighted materials to its own servers.  (Dkt. No. 128, p. 4; see 
also Dkt. 105, ¶43 (alleging that “it is reasonable to conclude that Giganews … likewise 
uploads infringing materials as well either to the USENET, or to its own servers.”).)  
After considerable discovery, there is simply no evidence to bear out that unlikely 
allegation. 
Rather than point to any evidence that Giganews’ employees or agents themselves 
uploaded, downloaded, otherwise copied, displayed, or modified any work to which 
Perfect 10 holds a copyright, Perfect 10 rehashes arguments already considered and 
rejected.  Namely, Perfect 10 once again argues that Giganews personally violated 
Perfect 10’s copyrights by allowing users to upload content to its servers and by 
obtaining and sending content to other Usenet servers through the peering process.  
(Dkt. No. 436, p. 19.)14  But the conduct of third party Usenet subscribers does not 
                     
14 Perfect 10 also contends that Giganews directly infringed by refusing to remove every post by individuals identified as repeat 
infringers.  (Dkt. No. 436, p. 19.)  As discussed in footnote 8, supra, Giganews had no obligation to indiscriminately remove 
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support a claim of direct liability as to Giganews.  The conduct of third parties is 
relevant, if at all, to a claim of secondary infringement (contributory or vicarious), not 
direct infringement.  And Perfect 10 fails to articulate any meaningful difference 
between the evidence before the Court and its allegations that Giganews “program[s] [its] 
servers to distribute and download infringing conduct” and that Giganews “control[s] 
which materials are distributed to and copied from other third party servers,” which Judge 
Matz held insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim of direct infringement.  (Dkt. 
No. 97, pp. 3, 7, 10-11.)  The Court finds none.15 
Moreover, Perfect 10’s contention that Giganews engages in direct infringement by 
“sell[ing] access to infringing Perfect 10 images to their subscribers in exchange for a 
monthly fee” was likewise rejected by Judge Matz as a basis for direct infringement.  
(Dkt. No. 97, pp. 3, 6-7, 13 (noting allegations that Defendants “charge their subscribers 
a fee” and that “rampant piracy committed by USENET users … [is] a part of 
[Defendants] business model” but dismissing claim for direct infringement for failure to 
state a claim”).  The analysis of this theory of direct liability has not changed after 
extensive discovery.  The evidence before the Court merely shows that Giganews offers 
its subscribers access to servers for a flat monthly fee (which varies depending on the 
bandwidth and ancillary services a user wishes to purchase).  There is no evidence, 
however, that Giganews specifically sells access to Perfect 10 copyrighted materials as 
opposed to access to the entire Usenet (of which Perfect 10 content is a fraction of a 
fraction), or even to erotic content in general.  In doing so, Giganews is no more directly 
liable for copyright infringement for selling access to the Usenet than a copy store selling 
access to its copy machines, which a third party then uses to infringe a copyright.  
“Although some of the people using the machine may directly infringe copyrights, courts 
analyze the machine owner's liability under the rubric of contributory infringement, not 
direct infringement.”  Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1369 (analogizing Usenet provider to 
owner of a copying machine). 
2. Livewire 
                                                                       
every post a repeat infringer ever posted and Perfect 10 may not shift its burden of policing copyright infringement to Giganews 
in the guise of a claim for direct infringement.  The Court does not address this argument further. 
 
15 Perfect 10 attempts to cast the fact that Giganews had to affirmatively enter into a peering agreement with other Usenet 
providers before it could begin peering as evidence that the peering process somehow involves human intervention and is, 
therefore “volitional” under Netcom.  But the evidence before the Court is that those agreements are entirely content neutral.  
The fact that a human had to intervene to form the content-neutral peering agreement is no more evidence of direct liability than 
the fact that, at some point in the past, a human had to make the computer server, plug it in, or turn it on.  The undisputed 
evidence before the court demonstrates that the peering process itself, in which the content is actually exchanged and copied is 
a completely automated process.  “[D]esigning or implementing a system that automatically and uniformly creates temporary 
copies of all data sent through it” is not a direct cause of infringement.  Netcom, 907 F.Supp. at 1369; accord CoStar, Inc. v. 
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d at 555 (“automatic copying, storage, and transmission of copyrighted materials, when instigated by 
others, does not render an ISP strictly liable for copyright infringement under §§ 501 and 106 of the Copyright Act.”). 
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The evidence of direct infringement as to Livewire is even more sparse.  The sum 
total of evidence before the Court as to Livewire is that Livewire pays Giganews to 
provide subscribers access to Giganews’ Usenet servers and, in turn, charges its 
subscribers a fee to access those Usenet servers.  There is no evidence that Livewire 
operates any Usenet servers of its own, or that any infringing material has ever appeared 
on any of the Web servers Livewire does own and operate.  (See footnote 4, supra)  
There is simply no evidence that Livewire has any direct role in any act of infringement 
whatsoever, let alone any act of infringement relating to Perfect 10’s copyrighted works. 
Perfect 10 attempts to construe Judge Collins’ order as holding that such evidence 
is sufficient to prove direct infringement.  If that were so, however, Giganews would be 
equally liable for direct infringement, a result both Judge Matz’ order and Judge Collins’ 
orders preclude.  Even if that were not the case, the portion of Judge Collins’ order 
Perfect 10 cites for this proposition does not support their claim.  In denying Livewire’s 
motion to dismiss Perfect 10’s claim for direct infringement, Judge Collins relied 
exclusively upon Perfect 10’s allegation that Livewire “sells the infringing material it 
receives from Giganews at different prices, depending on usage.”  (Dkt. No. 128, p. 4 
(emphasis added) (quoting) Dkt. No. 105, ¶59.)  As discussed above with respect to 
Giganews, however, after years of extensive discovery,16 there is no evidence to support 
this allegation.  Rather, the undisputed evidence affirmatively shows Livewire sells 
access to all the content available on Giganews’ servers.  There is no evidence that 
Livewire sells any of Perfect 10’s copyrighted material.17  To “sell” is to “transfer 
(property) by sale.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 632 (2d. Pocket Ed. 2001).  There is no 
evidence, however, that Livewire even had a property interest in any of the content on 
Giganews’ servers that Livewire is capable of selling.  There is no evidence, for 
example, that Livewire is capable of editing, modifying, deleting, or otherwise altering 
anything on Giganews’ servers.  The undisputed evidence instead shows that Livewire’s 
sole property interest in Giganews’ servers is the right to access the servers, which it then 
assigns to end-users for a price.  But the right to of access to something is entirely 
distinct from the right to possess or sell the thing itself.  An easement to the beach is not 
the same as owning the beach, and sale of that easement to someone else is not a sale of 
the beach.  The undisputed record shows that Livewire owns the easement, not the 
                     
16 Fact and expert discovery in this action are both closed. 
 
17 To “sell” is to “transfer (property) by sale.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 632 (2d. Pocket Ed. 2001).  There is no evidence, 
however, that Livewire even has a property interest in any of the content on Giganews’ servers that it is capable of selling.  
There is no evidence, for example, that Livewire is capable of editing, modifying, deleting, or otherwise altering anything on 
Giganews’ servers.  The undisputed evidence instead shows that Livewire’s sole property interest in Giganews’ servers is the 
right to access the servers, which it then assigns to end-users for a price.  But the right to of access to something is entirely 
distinct from the right to possess or sell the thing itself.  An easement to the beach is not the same as owning the beach, and sale 
of that easement to someone else is not a sale of the beach.  The undisputed record shows that Livewire owns the easement, not 
the beach.  Perfect 10’s essentially argues that sale of the easement is the equivalent of selling a handful of shells found on the 
beach.  It is not. 
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beach.  Perfect 10 essentially argues that sale of the easement is the equivalent of selling 
a handful of shells found on the beach.  It is not. 
The only thing Livewire sells is content-neutral access to the Usenet, in general,18 
which even Perfect 10 acknowledges has both infringing and non-infringing uses.  See 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997) (observing that “thousands of such 
[news]groups” on the Usenet, “each serving to foster an exchange of information or 
opinion on a particular topic running the gamut from, say, the music of Wagner to Balkan 
politics to AIDS prevention to the Chicago Bulls.”); cf. Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, 
Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d 640, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (distinguishing owners of service that was 
exclusively designed and solely used to copy copyrighted material, who could be held 
liable for direct infringement, evidenced direct liability, from the owner of a service that 
“offered a mix of protected and public” content, who could not be held liable for direct 
infringement). 
3. Law of the Case and Reconsideration 
In an implicit admission that the facts before the Court are no different than the 
allegations Judge Matz and Judge Collins previously rejected, Perfect 10 repeatedly urges 
the Court to depart from Judge Matz’ and Judge Collins’ prior rulings.  (See, e.g., Dkt. 
No. 436, pp. 116-17, 25.)19  The Court declines to do so.  To begin with, the Court 
thinks those orders were rightly decided for the reasons discussed above.  More 
importantly, though, those orders are the law of the case.  “Under the ‘law of the case’ 
doctrine, a court is ordinarily precluded from reexamining an issue previously decided by 
the same court, or a higher court, in the same case.”  Richardson v. United States, 841 
F.2d 993, 996 (9th Cir. 1988).  Generally, a court may only exercise its discretion to 
depart from the law of the case where: 
                     
18 Or at least the substantial portion of the Usenet available through Giganews’ servers. 
 
19 For example, Perfect 10 criticizes Judge Collins holding that Giganews does not directly violate Perfect 10’s right of 
distribution by way of the Mimo application because Judge Collins ruling did not address, and is contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007).  (Dkt. No. 436 at p. 16.)  Judge Collins 
did not need to independently address Amazon because Judge Matz had already done so.  Specifically, Judge Matz held Perfect 
10’s citation to Amazon on this point was inapposite because “there was no question in [Amazon] that the defendant had 
committed a volitional act … .”  (Dkt. No. 97, p. 9.)  Rather, in Amazon, the evidence showed that the defendants were not 
passively allowing users to view images uploaded by third parties, but that the defendants themselves modified the offending 
image into a smaller “thumbnail” image which the defendants then copied to their own servers for their own use.  Amazon, 508 
F.3d at 1155.  Notably, it was Judge Matz who originally held the defendants’ conduct in Amazon (of modifying, copying, and 
then displaying their own version of the image) constituted direct infringement.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Matz on this 
point, noting that it was undisputed in that the defendants in that case directly communicated copies of those modified 
thumbnail images to end-users.  Id. at 1160.  Because the defendant’s active involvement in the infringement was undisputed, 
the Ninth Circuit declined to decide “whether an entity that merely passively owns and manages an Internet bulletin board or 
similar system violates a copyright owner's display and distribution rights when the users of the bulletin board or similar system 
post infringing works.”  Id. at 1160 n.6.  There is no evidence in this case that either Giganews or Livewire ever modified any 
of Perfect 10’s copyrighted images posted by third parties for Giganews’ own use. 
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“1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; 2) an intervening 
change in the law has occurred; 3) the evidence on remand is 
substantially different; 4) other changed circumstances exist; or 
5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result. Failure to apply 
the doctrine of the law of the case absent one of the requisite 
conditions constitutes an abuse of discretion.” 
United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876. 
As discussed above, however, Judge Matz’ and Judge Collins’ orders were soundly 
decided, not clearly erroneous.  Nor has the intervening law changed.  Perfect 10 cites 
a single case (Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDIGI, Inc., supra) that was decided after Judge 
Matz’ order, and no cases decided after Judge Collins expressly adopted Judge Matz’ 
holding.  (See Dkt. No. 128, p. 3 n.1 (“The Court agrees with Judge Matz’s scholarly 
analysis of the ‘volitional act’ requirement, notably that it is a means of showing a 
defendant’s direct involvement in the infringement, that is, that the defendant directly 
caused the infringement.  The Court sees no reason to depart from Judge Matz’s 
analysis.”)  In any event, Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDIGI, Inc. is inapplicable because, 
in that case, the offending computer software was designed for the sole purpose of 
copying copyrighted material from one computer to another.  Capitol Records, LLC v. 
ReDigi, Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d at 657.  The district court took great pains to emphasize this 
unique aspect of that case (see Id. (noting “ReDigi's founders built a service where only 
copyrighted work could be sold” and “ReDigi's Media Manager scans a user's computer 
to build a list of eligible files that consists solely of protected music purchased on iTunes) 
(emphasis in original)), and expressly distinguished its facts from cases where the 
offending service “offered a mix of protected and public” content.  Id. (contrasting the 
facts in that case, which evidenced direct liability, with the facts in Cartoon Network LP, 
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., supra, 536 F.3d 121, which did not). 
And, as already noted, the evidence before the Court is identical to the allegations 
before Judge Matz.  To the extent the evidence differs from the allegations before Judge 
Collins a few months later, the evidence only defeats Perfect 10’s claim that Giganews 
itself uploaded, downloaded, transferred, copied, or displayed any of Perfect 10’s 
copyrighted content.  Perfect 10 fails to identify any manner in which circumstances 
have changed or how properly applying the law would result in a “manifest injustice.”  
Under these circumstances, it would constitute an abuse of discretion to depart Judge 
Matz’ and Judge Collins’ prior holdings.  If Perfect 10 believed there was a basis to seek 
reconsideration of those orders, it was required to do so by way of a separately noticed 
motion for reconsideration and within a reasonable amount of time.  Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 
60(b), (c).  It did not do so. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
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A claim for direct copyright liability demands evidence that the defendant had a 
direct hand in causing the infringement.  The undisputed evidence before the Court, 
however, demonstrates that Defendants had no direct causal role in the alleged 
infringement.  Perfect 10’s attempt to hold Giganews and Livewire liable for direct 
infringement conflates the doctrines of direct and indirect liability and ignores Judge 
Matz’ and Judge Collins’ express holdings that Perfect 10 could not proceed on a theory 
of direct liability without something more.  After extensive discovery, there is nothing 
more.  Both the law of the case and this Court’s independent analysis demand the 
conclusion that Defendants cannot be liable for direct infringement as a matter of law, 
and the Court GRANTS their motion for partial summary judgment on Perfect 10’s 
claim for direct infringement.  (Dkt. No. 357.)  Because Perfect 10’s other theories of 
indirect liability as to Livewire have already been dismissed without leave to amend, this 
order completely disposes of all of Perfect 10’s claims against Livewire.  The Court will 
separately address Perfect 10’s remaining claims for indirect liability as to Giganews in 
its ruling on the parties’ other summary judgment motions. 
The Court having granted summary judgment on the issue of direct liability in 
favor of defendants, Perfect 10’s mirror image motion for summary judgment on the 
question of direct liability (Dkt. No. 453) is DENIED AS MOOT. 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Rule 7-15, the Court 
finds this matter appropriate for determination without oral argument, and the hearing 
previously scheduled for November 17, 2014 at 10:00 a.m. is hereby VACATED.   
IT IS SO ORDERED 
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